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Abstract
Motivated by safety-critical classification problems, we investigate adversarial at-
tacks against cost-sensitive classifiers. We use current state-of-the-art adversarially-
resistant neural network classifiers [1] as the underlying models. Cost-sensitive
predictions are then achieved via a final processing step in the feed-forward eval-
uation of the network. We evaluate the effectiveness of cost-sensitive classifiers
against a variety of attacks and we introduce a new cost-sensitive attack which
performs better than targeted attacks in some cases. We also explored the measures
a defender can take in order to limit their vulnerability to these attacks. This
attacker/defender scenario is naturally framed as a two-player zero-sum finite game
which we analyze using game theory.
1 Introduction
Many safety-critical classification problems are not indifferent to the different types of possible errors.
For example, when classifying tumors in medical images one may be relatively indifferent between
misclassifications within the super-categories of malignant or benign tumors, but may be particu-
larly interested in avoiding misclassifications across those categories, for example misidentifying a
malignant Lobular Carcinoma tumor as being instead a benign Fibroadenoma tumor [2].
It is a relatively simple matter to adjust the predictions of a trained classifier to reflect the different
costs associated with the various types of classification errors using a formalism known as cost-
sensitivity [3, 4]. Without cost-sensitivity, the most likely class is taken to be the prediction made by
a classification model. In contrast, cost-sensitive classifiers make predictions by first computing the
expected cost associated with each prediction, and then taking the class with the smallest expected
cost to be the model prediction.
Motivated by safety-critical classification problems, we investigate adversarial attacks on cost-
sensitive classifiers. We use current state-of-the-art adversarially-resistant neural network classifiers
[1] as the underlying models, and we considered multiple types of attacks, as well as various defensive
actions that may be taken to mitigate the effect of the attacks. Our key findings are:
• Classifiers face a trade-off between maximizing accuracy and minimizing cost:
Predictions can be made with the goal of either maximizing the accuracy or minimizing
the expected cost. While these are not diametrically opposed goals (for example a perfect
classifier will incur zero cost), in practice there will be a trade-off where the classifier can
make conservative predictions which lower both the cost and the overall accuracy.
• The attacker faces a trade-off between minimizing accuracy and maximizing cost:
Similarly, the attacker can craft adversarial examples designed to either minimize the
defender’s accuracy or increase their average cost. As before, these goals aren’t necessarily
in conflict with one another - for example if the attacks succeed 100% of the time, then both
goals may be simultaneously accomplished, but in practice attacks will only succeed some
fraction of the time and the attacker will be faced with a trade-off.
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• Calibration leads to both better defenses and more effective attacks:
The expected cost depends on the predicted probabilities of the neural network and not just
on the overall class prediction. Therefore, it is important that the classifier produce accurate
probability estimates. We find that both cost-sensitive defenses and attacks may be improved
by calibrating these estimates.
• The attacker/defender scenario is naturally analyzed in terms of game theory:
We explored many different pairings of attacks and defensive measures. The identification
of good strategies becomes more difficult as the number of possible scenarios increases. We
observe that this problem is naturally framed as a two-player zero-sum finite game, and
therefore the game theoretic concepts of Nash equilibria and dominant strategies may be
used to analyze the attacker/defender competition.
2 Cost-Sensitivity for classification problems
In this section we provide a brief review of cost-sensitivity [3, 4]. Throughout this work we shall
consider classification problems and denote the inputs as x, and we will use the indices A,B to run
over all possible K classes, i.e. A ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}.
Of central importance in cost-sensitive classification problems is the cost-matrix CAB , which is
defined to be the cost of predicting class A when the correct class is B. The cost may be measured in
any units since the cost-sensitive predictions are unaffected by scaling the cost matrix by an overall
constant. We shall require that the costs are non-negative, CAB ≥ 0, with equality if and only if
A = B, which reflects the fact that a correct classification should incur no cost. Given the cost matrix
and p(A|x), the model estimate for the probability that an input x belongs to class A, the expected
cost of predicting class A will be denoted as CA(x), and is simply [3]
CA(x) =
∑
B
CAB p(B|x) . (1)
The cost-sensitive (CS) prediction is then the class for which the expected cost is smallest, i.e.
ACS(x) := argmin
A
CA(x) . (2)
In contrast, in most classification settings the prediction is taken to be the most likely class:
AMP(x) := argmax
A
p(A|x) , (3)
which we shall refer to as the maximum probability (MP) prediction.
2.1 Geometry of cost-sensitive predictions
To gain an intuition for how cost-sensitive predictions compare to the more standard maximum
probability predictions, it is useful to consider the problem from a geometrical perspective. Binary
classification (K = 2) is especially simple: if the probability of class 1 is denoted p, then the
probability of class 2 is (1 − p). The maximum probability prediction is determined by whether
p < 0.5 (prediction is class 2) or p > 0.5 (prediction is class 1). The effect of cost-sensitivity then is
to shift the decision threshold from p∗ = 0.5 to a new value determined by the relative cost of the
two types of errors. That is, class 1 is predicted if p > p∗, where now
p∗ =
C12
C12 + C21
. (4)
The higher dimensional case of K ≥ 3 is more interesting. In this case it is more useful to work
in terms of the probability simplex, which is a (K − 1)-dimensional hyper-surface embedded in
K-dimensions. The embedding coordinates are the class probabilities, i.e. p(A|x) for an input x, and
the simplex is the surface satisfying the constraints 0 ≤ p(A|x) ≤ 1 ∀A and∑A p(A|x) = 1. The
vertices of the simplex are the points for which all the probability mass is placed on a single class.
The simplex may be divided into cells such that all points within a single cell will lead to the same
maximum probability prediction. This is depicted for K = 3 in Fig. 1. The effect of cost-sensitivity
is to shift the cell boundaries, for example as in Fig. 2. In general, cells representing classes which
are costly to misidentify, for example the malignant Lobular Carcinoma tumor discussed above, will
expand, corresponding to an increased risk aversion.
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Figure 1: The unit 2-simplex as a surface em-
bedded in the 3-dimensional space spanned by
the probability coordinates (p1, p2, p3). The
simplex has been divided into cells correspond-
ing to the maximum-probability prediction.
The figure has been oriented with the origin
behind the simplex.
Figure 2: The same simplex plotted in Fig. 1,
now with the cells determined according to
the minimum cost prediction. The cost matrix
used here is given by C12 = C21 = 1, C31 =
C32 = 3, and C13 = C23 = 10 (and zero
diagonal entries). Misidentifying class 3 incurs
a large cost, and hence the class 3 cell has
expanded accordingly.
2.2 Multi-class classification problems with two super-categories
A general cost-matrix forK-class classification is determined byK(K−1) parameters (assuming that
the diagonals are zero, representing zero cost for correct predictions). Both for simplicity and because
we are motivated by scenarios such as the benign/malignant tumor classification discussed above,
we consider a much smaller family of cost-matrices. We split the K classes into 2 super-categories,
which we call the “sensitive" and “insensitive" categories. Let there be m members of the insensitive
group, and K −m members of the sensitive group, and split the label index A as a = 1, ...,m for
the insensitive group members, and α = m + 1, ...,K for the sensitive group. We shall consider
scenarios where the main concern is inter-category misclassifications, especially misclassifying a
sensitive class as an insensitive class (i.e. misidentifying a malignant tumor as a benign tumor).
Intra-category misclassifications will also have associated costs, albeit they will be less significant
than inter-category costs.
In this scenario, we can break the cost-matrix into 4 blocks,
CAB =
(
Cab Caβ
Cαb Cαβ
)
, (5)
and take each constituent block matrix to be
Cab = c
(ab) (1− δab) , Caβ = c(aβ) , Cαb = c(αb) , Cαβ = c(αβ) (1− δαβ) . (6)
Here the lower-case c’s are constants, and δab and δαβ are Kronecker deltas. The constant c(ab) is
the cost of misclassifications within the insensitive super-category, and c(αβ) is similarly the cost of
misclassifications within the sensitive super-category. The off-diagonal term c(aβ) represents the cost
of mis-labeling a sensitive class as insensitive, and vice versa for c(αb). Motivated by safety-critical
scenarios where the most costly type of mistake is mis-identifying a sensitive class as insensitive, we
will assume that the different costs obey the following inequalities:
0 < c(ab) ≤ c(αβ) ≤ c(αb)  c(aβ) , (7)
so that the cost-matrix is determined by just 4 independent numbers.
3 Adversarial examples for cost-sensitive classifiers
Cost-sensitivity is particularly relevant for safety-critical scenarios because it enables classifiers to
take into account the fact that some mistakes are more deleterious than others. This general framework
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naturally complements the context of adversarial examples, which are artificially generated inputs
of a classifier designed to cause mistakes [5], and which are an important threat for safety-critical
applications of classifiers.1 The general idea that different misclassifications are associated with
different costs should be reflected both in how the classifier makes predictions and in the types of
adversarial attacks a malicious actor would choose to employ in order to cause maximum damage.
Concretely, we consider an attacker/defender scenario in which the defender is a neural network
classifier, and the attacker is an agent attempting to fool the defender by presenting it adversarial
examples. We will investigate multiple types of attacks against classifiers making predictions
according to both the maximum probability criterion and the minimum cost criterion. We also
consider both white-box and black-box scenarios, in which the attacker has or does not have access
to the defender network, respectively.
As usual, we take the attack to be defined by a constrained optimization problem. To set notation, let
`(x) be the objective function (` may also depend on other quantities such as the target label), and
the optimization problem is then
δ = argmax
δ∈∆
` (x+ δ) . (8)
Here ∆ is the attack set, the set of allowable perturbations around a given clean input x. Throughout
this work, we will take ∆ to be an -ball in the `∞ norm, i.e. ∆ = {δ : ||δ||∞ ≤ }.2 Independent of
the objective function, in all cases we shall use the same projected gradient descent (PGD) method of
[7] to solve the optimization problem and to generate examples. The attack PGD update rule is
x(t+1) = Π∆
[
x(t) + α sign
(
∇x `(x(t)
)]
, (9)
where x(t) := x + δ(t) represents a sequence of perturbed inputs, α is the step-size parameter,
and Π∆ is a projection operator that projects the perturbation down to the attack set ∆. The initial
perturbation, δ(0), will be randomly initialized within the attack set ∆.
3.1 Targeted attacks
We will consider two types of adversarial attacks. The first is a targeted attack, where the objective
function is given by the negative cross-entropy of the target label. That is, if Atarget is the target label,
then
`CE(x, Atarget) = log p(Atarget|x+ δ) . (10)
In terms of the probability simplex coordinates, the optimal solution is when all the probability mass
has been placed on the target class, i.e. p(Atarget|x) = 1. The target class could be chosen randomly,
or it could be chosen to induce a particularly costly error. As an example in the cost-sensitive setting,
an effective attack would be one which tricked the classifier into thinking that x belonged to the
insensitive class when in fact it belonged to a sensitive one.
3.2 Maximum minimum expected cost attacks
If the goal of the attacker is to increase the costs of the defender’s mistakes, it is natural to consider
an attack which is designed to explicitly increase the expected cost. Therefore, we introduce the
Maximum Minimum Expected Cost Attack (or maxi-min attack for short):
`maxi-min(x) = min
A
CA(x+ δ) . (11)
Unlike the targeted attack, the maxi-min attack does not depend on the true class. Thus, the maxi-min
attack always aims to modify the input x so that the point in the probability simplex p(A|x + δ)
moves to the point of maximal minA CA(x+δ), which by symmetry can be seen to be the intersection
1See [6] for an analysis of the concrete ways in which adversarial examples are relevant for AI Safety.
2Other authors, most notably [6], have noted a number of shortcomings in using this attack set for research
into safety-critical implications of adversarial examples. We do not disagree with these observations, but will
work with the `∞ ball nonetheless both for mathematical convenience and because we regard this issue as
orthogonal to the main idea of the current work, which is the relevance of cost-sensitivity to adversarial example
research.
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point where the costs are identical for all class predictions A. In particular, for the K = 3 example
of Fig. 2, this is the point where all 3 cell boundaries intersect. Because this attack aims to bring
p(A|x+ δ) to an interior point in the simplex, as opposed to a vertex, it will not be as effective as a
targeted attack with cost-sensitive targets - assuming that the optimization problem associated with
both attacks can be fully solved. For example, for the cost matrix considered in Fig. 2, the expected
cost at the intersection of all three cell boundaries is CA = 12/5, whereas a cost of C13 = 10 could
be achieved if the prediction was 1 and the true class was 3. However, the optimization problem
defining adversarial attacks is rarely able to be solved exactly, and thus there could well be instances
where the maxi-min attack is more effective - indeed, we shall find this to be the case in what follows.
As far as we are aware, we are the first to consider adversarial attacks designed to directly maximize
the cost. Recently, Zhang and Evans [8] considered a cost-sensitive extension of Wong and Kolter’s
approach towards developing provably robust classifiers [9]. In the Zhang and Evans extension,
robustness is defined with respect to cost, as opposed to the overall misclassification error. Our work
is complementary to theirs as we consider attacks designed to explicitly increase the cost.
4 Attack comparison
In this section we detail the numerical experiments used to compare the efficacy of the 3 different
types of attacks considered here.
4.1 Experimental set-up
We considered the task of image classification on the ImageNet dataset [10]. Our motivating interest
is near-term scenarios in which an imperfect but high-performance image classification system
is employed in a safety-critical application. Given the amount of attention adversarial examples
have received, it seems plausible that many organizations will be cognizant of the threat posed by
adversarial examples, and will therefore choose to employ models with some level of resistance. For
simple enough problems one can obtain provable guarantees regarding robustness (see for example
[9, 11] and references therein), but these methods do not currently scale for modern image classifiers
trained on high-resolution images.3 Thus, we shall focus on problems for which the vulnerability to
adversarial examples can only be mitigated, not fully eliminated or bounded.
We consider attacking networks which have been adversarially trained [13, 14, 15, 7], so that they
are somewhat resistant to adversarial attacks. In particular, we used pre-trained models released as
part of the recent work [1]. Three such pre-trained models were released: ResNeXt-101, ResNet-152
Denoise, and ResNet-152 Baseline. These models obtain between 62-68% top-1 accuracy on clean
images, and 52-57% accuracy on adversarially perturbed images with random targets (we specify the
attack details below). All three models were trained on adversarial examples, and the first two also
incorporate a novel form of feature de-noising to enhance their resistance to adversarial examples.
A simple but crucial point is that a cost matrix is required in order to implement cost-sensitive
predictions. The cost matrix encapsulates the costs associated with different types of mistakes,
but these may be hard to quantify in certain applications. To return to the example of identifying
malignant tumors, clearly false positives are less costly mistakes than false negatives, but are they 10x
worse, 100x worse, or 1000x worse? These valuations must be made for each application, and could
involve a rich set of considerations which we shall not get into here. Instead, we simply consider an
arbitrary cost matrix with values chosen according to what seems like plausible values. In particular,
we let there be m = 900 insensitive classes and K −m = 100 sensitive classes, with the costs taken
to be4
c(ab) = 1 , c(αβ) = 2 , c(αb) = 5 , c(aβ) = 200 . (12)
Although these values were mostly chosen arbitrarily, they were picked so that the effect of being
cost-sensitive would be non-trivial. For example, as c(aβ) →∞, with the other values held constant, a
cost-sensitive classifier will always err on the side of caution and predict the sensitive class. Similarly,
if the differences in cost are very slight, then a cost-sensitive classifier will mostly make predictions
3As this work was nearing completion progress on this problem was made in [12].
4We note that we randomly permuted the ImageNet labels in order to avoid grouping together similar classes
in the insensitive/sensitive super-categories.
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according to the most likely class. These values were chosen to avoid either extreme. An additional
complication is that an adversary may not know (or may only partially know) the cost matrix used
by the defender network. Thus, in cost-sensitive adversarial examples the cost-matrix becomes part
of the white-box/black-box characterization of the problem. In this work, we assume that the cost
matrix is known to the attacker.
4.2 Experimental results
We generated adversarial attacks using the ResNeX1-101 pretrained model of Ref. [1], and evaluated
the attacks against each of the 3 pretrained models. The attack is a white-box attack when the
defending network is the same ResNeX1-101 model used to generate the attacks, and it is a black-box
attack when the defending network is either of the ResNet-152 models. We considered 3 types of
attacks: targeted with random targets, targeted with cost-sensitive targets, and the maxi-min attack
introduced in Sec. 3. We use the same attack parameters as in [1], and used PGD to generate attacks
for nsteps numbers of steps. The attacks are constrained to lie in an `∞ ball with  = 16, and the
step-size was taken to be α = 1 (except for the case nsteps = 10, in which case we set α = 1.6).
Furthermore, each attack was randomly initialized in the `∞ ball.
In Table 1 we present the results for white-box attacks generated using the ResNeXt-101 model. The
attack details are as follows. The number of PGD iterations was taken to be nsteps = 10, and the results
in this table were computed by averaging over 50,000 distinct attacks, one for each of the images in
the ImageNet validation set. Both the accuracy and average cost are evaluated for the two prediction
methods discussed above, maximum probability and minimum cost. The column abbreviations are
MP Acc - maximum probability prediction accuracy, MP Cost - maximum probability average cost,
MC Acc - minimum cost prediction accuracy, MC Cost - minimum cost prediction average cost. The
± values indicate the 95% confidence intervals, which were computed by assuming that the means
are normally distributed.
Table 1: White-box attacks
Attack Type MP Acc. (%) MP Cost MC Acc (%) MC Cost
ResNeXt-101
clean images 68.3± 0.4 6.47± 0.30 61.2± 0.4 2.38± 0.13
random targets 57.0± 0.4 8.44± 0.34 41.4± 0.4 2.94± 0.08
max cost targets 56.9± 0.4 8.45± 0.34 41.0± 0.4 2.98± 0.08
maxi-min cost 60.1± 0.4 13.94± 0.44 49.2± 0.4 3.50± 0.16
There are a number of interesting observations to make. First, it is unsurprising that the accuracy is
similar for both types of targeted attacks when the defending network makes maximum probability
predictions, since in this case the cost-sensitive targeted attacks represent a fairly large subset of
random targeted attacks. However, it is surprising that the cost-sensitive targeted attacks do such a poor
job of increasing the cost for both types of predictions. This illustrates that for adversarially-resistant
networks such as those of [1], targeted attacks are a poor way to increase the cost. The maxi-min cost
attack outperforms all others when it comes to increasing the cost, although it unsurprisingly leads to
fewer overall errors. The increase in cost is quite dramatic for a defending network making maximum
probability predictions, and although the effect is less significant for minimum cost predictions, it
still far outperforms either targeted attack.
We present additional results for black-box attacks and variable attack strength nsteps in Appendix A.
The black-box attacks performed similarly to the white-box attacks, although they were (predictably)
slightly less effective overall. Increasing nsteps significantly improved the performance of the attacks.
5 Calibration
In many machine learning applications, the only output of a classifier that is used is the class
prediction. However, there are many scenarios in which the probability estimates p(A|x) are also
used. Cost-sensitive learning is one such example as the minimum cost prediction, Eq. 2, depends
upon p(A|x). A perfect classifier would place all the probability mass on the correct label, i.e.
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p(A|x) = δA,Atrue , and the minimum cost prediction would be AMC = argminA CAAtrue = Atrue.5
For imperfect classifiers, a desirable property of the probability estimates p(A|x) is that they be
calibrated [16]. A classifier is said to be calibrated if the prediction accuracy agrees with the
probability estimates. For example, whenever a calibrated classifier makes a prediction of class A
for an input x with p(A|x) = 0.9, it will be correct on average 90% of the time. As a result, the
probability estimates of calibrated classifiers may be interpreted as confidences.
Both the minimum cost prediction, Eq. 2, and the maximum minimum expected cost attack, Eq. 11,
depend directly on the probability estimates p(A|x), and so it is natural to wonder if calibration might
significantly affect the results, for example by making the minimum cost predictions more robust,
or the maximum minimum expected cost attack more effective. Both the attacker and the defender
may separately elect to calibrate leading to a total of four possible scenarios. The scenario where
neither party calibrates was treated in the previous section, and in Appendix C we present results for
remaining scenarios (defender calibrates, attacker calibrates, and both calibrate). We also provide
details on the temperature-scaling calibration method used in Appendix B.
6 Game theoretic analysis
In the above sections and in the appendices we have considered a total of 6 different attacks (targeted
with random targets, targeted with cost-sensitive targets, and the maxi-min attack, each of which can
be either generated using a calibrated or an uncalibrated network), as well as 4 types of predictions
(maximum probability or minimum cost, each of which may be made using a calibrated or an
uncalibrated network). A convenient framework for analyzing the resulting 24 possible scenarios is
game theory.
The attacker/defender set-up considered here may be formulated as a finite zero-sum two-player
game. The pay-off of the attacker is the average cost, and the defender’s pay-off is the negative
average cost. The pay-off matrix for this game may be obtained using the uncalibrated results of
Table 1, together with the calibrated results presented in Table 4, 5, 6 in Appendix C. Here, MP
stands for “maximum probability", MC for "minimum cost", RT for “targeted with random targets",
CST for “targeted with cost-sensitive targets", and MM for “maxi-min". Notice that the first two
rows are identical - the temperature scaling calibration method used does not affect the maximum
probability prediction, and therefore it also does not affect the average misclassification costs).
Table 2: Attacker’s Pay-off matrix
Attacker
RT , ¬C RT , C CST , ¬C CST , C MM , ¬C MM , C
Defender
MP , ¬C 8.44 8.43 8.45 8.45 13.94 13.97
MP , C 8.44 8.43 8.45 8.45 13.94 13.97
MC, ¬C 2.94 2.95 2.98 3.00 3.50 4.16
MC, C 3.21 3.22 3.25 3.25 3.38 3.39
For this simple game, there is a single pure strategy Nash equilibrium (shown in bold in Table 2),
which is that the defender makes calibrated minimum cost predictions (MC,C), and the attacker
makes calibrated maxi-min attacks (MM,C). Note that (MM,C) is a dominant strategy for the
attacker, but (MC,C) is not dominant for the defender.
The result of this simple game theory analysis is that, in terms of the average cost, both parties should
calibrate, minimum cost predictions are better than maximum probability ones, and the best attack is
the maxi-min attack. These conclusions may well change with the many factors that went into this
analysis - the cost matrix, the underlying classification problem, the strength of the attacks (measured
in terms of nsteps and the size of the attack set ∆), etc. However, this overall framework for comparing
strategies should be generally applicable. It is possible that in more complicated scenarios the Nash
equilibrium will be a mixed strategy, as opposed to the pure strategy found here.
5Recall that we are assuming that the cost matrix satisfies CAB ≥ 0, with equality if and only if A = B.
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7 Conclusions and future directions
Safety critical systems are not likely to operate by simply selecting the most likely outcomes; they will
need to consider cost of those outcomes and determine the probability thresholds for their predictions
accordingly. At the same time, attacks on these cost-sensitive models are particularly important
to study because of the critical nature of these systems. We demonstrated several white-box and
black-box attacks on cost-sensitive classifiers built from state-of-the-art adversarially-resistant ResNet
image classifiers. These classifiers were made resistant by training them on targeted adversarial
examples, and we find that they are still vulnerable to attacks designed to increase the expected cost.
While our experimental results were generated for image classification systems, our general frame-
work should apply more broadly to any classification problem. Cost-sensitive classifiers and attacks
thereon can easily be envisioned for text analysis (e.g. be sure not to miss terrorist sentiments) or
industrial plant operation (e.g. be sure not to miss irregular signals and alerts that lead to accidents).
In fact, most applications are not indifferent between different types of misclassifications, making
cost-sensitivity broadly applicable. When those applications are safety-critical, an analysis of the
efficacy of attacks and defenses should be carried out.
Lastly, we conclude with some directions for future work. Much of this work implicitly assumes
that both parties (the defender and the attacker) know the cost matrix. In practice, it may be hard
to convert an implicit value system based on possibly vague and loosely-shared principles into an
explicit numerical matrix. Even when such a task is achievable, there are many scenarios where the
attacker would not be expected to have access to this information. Thus, one area of future work
involves studying the effect of imperfect knowledge of the cost-matrix for the attacker, and whether
the attacker can learn to infer the cost-matrix by observing the classifier predictions (and in turn using
this information to construct better attacks). It would also be interesting to study the effect of a noisy
cost-matrix, perhaps reflecting the challenges faced by the defender in encoding a value system into a
cost matrix.
A second line of work would be to go beyond the pre-trained models of [1], and to consider other
forms of adversarially-resistant models, especially ones for which analytic bounds could be obtained.
In particular, it would be very interesting to apply cost-sensitivity to certifiable adversarial robustness
[12], for which rigorous analytic results are possible. Lastly, it would also be interesting to extend
beyond `p norm-based attacks, and consider more comprehensive attack sets [6].
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A Additional results for uncalibrated attacks and predictions
In Sec. 4.2 we presented results for white-box attacks, with neither party calibrating. These attacks
were both generated by and submitted to the ResNeXt-101 model of [1]. Results for black-box attacks
may be obtained by submitting these same attacks to the other two adversarially-robust models
released by [1], the ResNet-152 DeNoise and the ResNet-152 Baseline models. These are shown in
Table 3, again for nsteps = 10. These results are qualitatively similar to the white-box results, which
demonstrates the transferability of adversarial attacks aimed at increasing the cost as well as the
overall classification error.
In addition to studying the transferability of attacks, we also investigated the dependence of the
white-box attack efficacy on nstep. To this end, we generated 10,000 attacks with nstep ranging from
10 to 1000. The results are plotted below in Fig. 3, which shows the cost and accuracy for both
types of predictions (maximum probability (MP) and minimum cost (MC)). The plots indicate that
in many cases increasing number of steps to about 100 or 200 significantly improves the efficacy
of the attack. In particular, larger values of nsteps allows the targeted attacks with cost-sensitive
targets to outperform the attacks with random targets in all cases. Additionally, with additional
steps the efficacy of the maxi-min attack decreases relative to the other attacks against a minimum
cost classifier, as shown in the bottom-right figure. Against a maximum probability classifier, the
maxi-min attack is far more effective at increasing the cost, as shown in the bottom-left figure.
B Temperature scaling calibration
The calibration of neural networks was originally studied in [16]. The issue was recently revisited for
more modern architectures in [17], and we shall adopt their methodology.
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Table 3: Black-box adversarial attacks
Attack Type MP Acc. (%) MP Cost MC Acc (%) MC Cost
ResNet-152 Denoise
clean images 65.3± 0.4 7.22± 0.32 58.5± 0.4 2.68± 0.14
random targets 55.4± 0.4 8.80± 0.35 45.0± 0.4 2.98± 0.11
max cost targets 55.2± 0.4 8.87± 0.35 44.7± 0.4 3.07± 0.12
maxi-min cost 58.7± 0.4 11.68± 0.40 49.5± 0.4 3.66± 0.17
ResNet-152 Baseline
clean images 62.3± 0.4 7.73± 0.33 55.7± 0.4 2.91± 0.15
random targets 51.6± 0.4 9.47± 0.36 42.8± 0.4 3.24± 0.13
max cost targets 51.7± 0.4 9.48± 0.36 42.8± 0.4 3.29± 0.13
maxi-min cost 55.0± 0.4 12.03± 0.41 46.1± 0.4 3.99± 0.18
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Figure 3: The accuracy and cost as a function of nsteps for the 3 different attacks considered here,
and for both types of predictions: maximum probability (MP) and minimum cost (MC). Adversarial
examples were generated for nsteps = 1000, with the output saved at intermediate values. Each curve
represents an average over 10,000 adversarial examples, each for a different unperturbed “clean”
image, and 95% confidence intervals have been added around the mean. As is especially evident
in the bottom-right plot, even with 10,000 images the confidence intervals are still quite large. Our
analysis would benefit from larger samples sizes, which are unfortunately not practical given our
computational resources and the time required to generate attacks with large values of nsteps.
The extent to which a classifier is well-calibrated may be measured by the Expected Calibration Error
(ECE) [18], which is defined as
ECE :=
M∑
m=1
|Bm|
n
|acc(Bm)− conf(Bm)| . (13)
Here, Bm with m = 1, ...,M represents a binning of predictions and n is the total number of samples.
Predictions are grouped into bin Bm if their confidence (i.e. probability estimate maxA p(A|x))
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lies within the interval
(
m−1
M ,
m
M
]
. Within each bin, the overall accuracy acc(Bm) and average
confidence conf(Bm) are computed. An ECE of 0 indicates that the classifier is perfectly calibrated.
There are many techniques for calibrating a classifier. Perhaps the simplest is temperature scaling, in
which the softmax operation relating the logits zA(x) to probabilities is modified via a temperature
term as follows:
pT (A|x) := exp (zA(x)/T )∑
B exp (zB(x)/T )
(14)
For T = 1, this reduces to the usual softmax operation. For T > 1, the probabilities are squeezed
to become closer to one another, and for T < 1 the probabilities are pushed apart so that there is a
wider disparity between them. The extreme limit of T →∞ corresponds to a uniform distribution,
and the limit T → 0 places all probability mass on the most probable label. An important property of
temperature scaling is that it preserves the ordering of the probabilities. For example, the temperature
scaling cannot change the sign of the relative log probabilities. Temperature scaling may be used
to calibrate a classifier by using a separate validation set to find the optimal temperature T∗ which
minimizes the ECE error, and then using this temperature to calibrate the probability estimates on the
test set data.
Both the minimum cost prediction, Eq. 2, and the maximum minimum expected cost attack, Eq. 11,
depend directly on the probability estimates p(A|x), and so it is natural to wonder if calibration
might significantly affect the results, for example by making the minimum cost predictions more
robust, or the maximum minimum expected cost attack more effective. We investigated this issue
for the white-box attacks in which both the attacking and defending network was the pre-trained
ResNeXt-101 model of [1]. First, we evaluated the calibration of the ResNeXt-101 model, using 5000
images, representing 10% of the full validation set. The ECE was found to be 0.055, representing a
fairly well-calibrated classifier. To gain a better sense for the calibration, in Fig. 4 below we plot the
so-called reliability diagram [17] showing conf(Bm) vs. acc(Bm).
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Confidence
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Reliability Diagram: ResNeXt-101
gap
outputs
Figure 4: Reliability diagram depicting the calibration of the ResNeXt-101 network when evaluated
on the first 5000 images of the ImageNet validation set (representing 10% of the full validation set).
The gap represents the quantity within the absolute value sign in Eq. 13. The Expected Calibration
Error (ECE) is 0.055, corresponding to a reasonably well-calibrated classifier.
The above reliability diagram and ECE value of 0.055 used the standard softmax operation, i.e. T = 1.
Allowing T to vary, an optimal value of ECE = 0.016 was found at the calibration temperature
T ∗ = 1.124.
C Calibration scenarios
The calibration temperature of T ∗ = 1.124 found above could be used by the defender, the attacker,
or both. The defender would be motivated to use calibrated probabilities so that their minimum cost
predictions would be (hopefully) more accurate, and similarly the attacker would be motivated to use
calibrated probabilities to generate more effective attacks. Thus, in the tables below we show results
for the case where the defender calibrates but the attacker does not (Table 4), the case where the
defender does not calibrate but the attacker does (Table 5), and the case in which both defender and
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attacker calibrate (Table 6). The case in which neither party calibrates is covered above in Table 1.
In all cases, the same calibration temperature T ∗ = 1.124 was used, and the results in the tables
correspond to an average over the 45,000 validation images not used in the calibration step.
Table 4: Defender calibrates (white-box attack)
Attack Type MP Acc. (%) MP Cost MC Acc (%) MC Cost
ResNeXt-101
clean images 68.3± 0.4 6.50± 0.32 57.5± 0.5 2.35± 0.11
random targets 57.0± 0.5 8.44± 0.36 34.2± 0.4 3.21± 0.05
max cost targets 56.9± 0.5 8.45± 0.36 33.7± 0.4 3.25± 0.06
maxi-min cost 60.1± 0.4 13.94± 0.46 37.6± 0.4 3.38± 0.10
Table 5: Attacker calibrates (white-box attack)
Attack Type MP Acc. (%) MP Cost MC Acc (%) MC Cost
ResNeXt-101
clean images 68.3± 0.4 6.50± 0.32 57.5± 0.5 2.35± 0.11
random targets 57.0± 0.5 8.43± 0.36 41.3± 0.5 2.95± 0.08
max cost targets 57.1± 0.5 8.45± 0.36 40.9± 0.5 3.00± 0.09
maxi-min cost 61.3± 0.5 13.97± 0.46 55.0± 0.5 4.16± 0.21
Table 6: Both attacker and defender calibrate (white-box attack)
Attack Type MP Acc. (%) MP Cost MC Acc (%) MC Cost
ResNeXt-101
clean images 68.3± 0.4 6.50± 0.32 57.5± 0.5 2.35± 0.11
random targets 57.0± 0.5 8.43± 0.36 34.1± 0.4 3.22± 0.06
max cost targets 57.1± 0.5 8.45± 0.36 33.7± 0.4 3.25± 0.06
maxi-min cost 61.3± 0.5 13.97± 0.46 46.2± 0.5 3.39± 0.14
In discussing the results, let us first draw attention to the impact of calibration on the clean images.
The maximum probability statistics are unaffected, which is to be expected since the temperature
scaling method of calibration used here cannot change the maximum probability prediction.6 For the
minimum cost predictions, the accuracy drops a non-trivial amount (from 61.2% to 57.5%) and the
cost decreases slightly.
Moving next to consider the effect of calibration on the efficacy of the attacks, the results show that
calibration (of either party) has a significant impact on the minimum cost predictions, but not on the
maximum probability ones. In discussing the results, we will take the perspective of the defender, and
assume that the attacker is held fixed. Consider first the case of an uncalibrated attacker. The results
show that the two types of targeted attacks are much more effective against a calibrated minimum
cost defender than an uncalibrated one. The accuracy decreases (from about 41% to about 34%) and
the cost increases (from about 3 to about 3.2). Interestingly, the trend is reversed for the maxi-min
attack. This attack is more effective against an uncalibrated minimum cost classifier (3.50 compared
to 3.38 for a calibrated one). Thus, whether the defender should calibrate or not depends on the attack
type.
Consider next the case in which the attacker calibrates. Once again, the maximum probability
statistics are only very weakly affected by the defender’s decision to calibrate. For the minimum
cost predictions, it is again the case that the targeted attacks are more effective against a calibrated
6The astute reader will have noticed that there are in fact slight differences between the MP results for clean
un-calibrated and calibrated images. This are due to the fact that the averages computed in this section are over
45,000 images, as opposed to the 50,000 used in the previous section.
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defender, whereas the maxi-min attack is rendered less effective by calibration. Here the distinction
is even more pronounced than before. The cost for an uncalibrated minimum cost classifier is 4.16,
and drops to 3.39 after calibration.
To summarize, calibration is important for minimum cost classifiers. A defender can reduce their
vulnerability to a maxi-min attack designed to increase the expected cost by calibrating, and similarly
an attacker can increase the effectiveness of the maxi-min attack against a minimum cost defender by
calibrating. Against targeted attacks, however, calibration can decrease the defender’s performance.
In Sec. 6 we use game theory to conduct a more systematic analysis of the various strategies available
to both the attacker and defender.
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